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Abstract—Researchers have demonstrated various techniques
for fingerprinting and identifying devices. Previous approaches
have identified devices from their network traffic or transmitted
signals while relying on software or operating system specific
artifacts (e.g., predictability of protocol header fields) or charac-
teristics of the underlying protocol (e.g., central frequency offset).
As these constraints can be a hindrance in real-world settings, we
introduce a practical, generalizable approach that offers signifi-
cant operational value for a variety of scenarios, including as an
additional factor of authentication for preventing impersonation
attacks. Our goal is to identify artifacts in transmitted signals
that are caused by a device’s unique hardware “imperfections”
without any knowledge about the nature of the signal.
We develop RF-DCN, a novel Deep Complex-valued Neural
Network (DCN) that operates on raw RF signals and is completely
agnostic of the underlying applications and protocols. We present
two DCN variations: (i) Convolutional DCN (CDCN) for modeling
full signals, and (ii) Recurrent DCN (RDCN) for modeling time
series. Our system handles raw I/Q data from open air captures
within a given spectrum window, without knowledge of the
modulation scheme or even the carrier frequencies. This enables
the first exploration of device fingerprinting where the fingerprint
of a device is extracted from open air captures in a completely
automated way. We conduct an extensive experimental evaluation
on large and diverse datasets (with WiFi and ADSB signals)
collected by an external red team and investigate the effects
of different environmental factors as well as neural network
architectures and hyperparameters on our system’s performance.
RF-DCN is able to detect the device of interest in realistic settings
with concurrent transmissions within the band of interest from
multiple devices and multiple protocols. While our experiments
demonstrate the effectiveness of our system, especially under
challenging conditions where other neural network architectures
break down, we identify additional challenges in signal-based
fingerprinting and provide guidelines for future explorations.
Our work lays the foundation for more research within this vast
and challenging space by establishing fundamental directions for
using raw RF I/Q data in novel complex-valued networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the feasibility of identifying devices
through browser or device fingerprints has garnered significant
attention [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]. Such techniques are not
restricted to device characteristics and specifications but can
also fingerprint devices based on imperfections inherent in the
device’s hardware [8]. In an alternative line of research, tech-
niques have been proposed for fingerprinting devices based on
unique characteristics of the device’s hardware that are exposed
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in their transmissions. A remote network-based fingerprinting
technique was presented in the seminal work by Kohno et
al. [9], but could be prevented by software-level defenses [10].
Brik et al. [10] proposed a more robust but geographically-
localized technique that focused on transmitted radio frequency
(RF) signals. However, their approach also relied on protocol-
specific information, and crucial practical factors were not
considered in the experimentation and evaluation. While both
approaches pose significant contributions, the diversity of
wireless protocols in the wild (which differ considerably across
versions or implementations [11]), coupled with the emergence
of new protocols and standards, hinders their applicability
in many real-world scenarios. Even the more generalizable
techniques by Danev et al. [12], [13] require, at least, some
knowledge of higher-level but protocol-defined information,
such as the frequencies of the carrier or sub-carrier signals
or the bandwidth of the transmission channel. Inspired by the
extensive prior research in the area, we explore novel methods
to ameliorate current limitations and study the feasibility of
fingerprinting with no prior knowledge of even the central
carrier frequencies or modulation schemes involved.
Furthermore, while RF signals are inherently complex-
valued, limitations of both theoretical frameworks and avail-
able development tools have constrained RF-based research
to real-valued conventional networks that severely limit the
representational power of generated models. However, recent
breakthroughs laid the theoretical foundations for complex-
valued networks [14] and paved the road for a new strain of
deep learning models which are able to work natively with
complex data. These networks have higher representational
capacity and thus more degrees of freedom, allowing them
to locate appropriate manifolds that are out of the reach of
conventional real-valued networks. In this work, we leverage
the power of complex-valued deep learning architectures, study
their ability to operate on raw complex RF data, and devise
methodologies for training these novel networks. Our models
are trained on raw I/Q data of signals captured under chal-
lenging environmental conditions in real settings, to show their
applicability in practical and large scale deployments. In fact,
RF-DCN is able to fingerprint devices using open air captures
without any protocol preprocessing, and without knowledge of
the underlying protocol or what carrier frequencies to look for.
Specifically, our system guides the deep neural network
towards identifying the artifacts in signals that are left by the
unavoidable minor hardware variations or impairments (hereby
referred to as “imperfections”) that occur during the manu-
facturing process. To train our models and demonstrate their
performance under different conditions, we utilize a plethora
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of datasets with as many as 1,000 devices. With each sample
corresponding to a captured transmission of only 64 µseconds,
our total training set requires just 6.4-51.2 milliseconds worth
of captured signals per device. We show that when using only a
64 µs long signal, RF-DCN can correctly fingerprint the device
72% and 100% of the time for WiFi and ADS-B transmitters
respectively. We also show that our system is able to train a
single model for both types and obtain an accuracy of 82%
despite the drastic differences between the two signals (i.e.,
protocols, transmission frequencies, and modulation schemes).
We find that RF-DCN is completely protocol-agnostic at
the different spectrum ranges of our dataset and can handle
devices that operate at multiple ranges (e.g., a device that
transmits WiFi at 2.4GHz and 5GHz) without any prior
knowledge, without relying on protocol implementation flaws
like predictable sequence numbers [15], exposed device identi-
fiers [16], [17], [18] or software-level data patterns (our dataset
only includes control packets). Our system can be applied in
a defensive capacity in a wide range of different scenarios,
including device-authentication for authorizing access to re-
sources (e.g., a cell tower or access point), detecting unautho-
rized or fraudulent devices in a restricted area, and unmasking
spoofed transmissions (including relay attacks or attacks us-
ing compromised certificates). Nonetheless, our experimental
evaluation is designed to abstract away the specificities of
the deployment scenario and focuses on the central task of
identifying devices based on their transmitted RF signals.
Overall, our research presents new techniques for handling
raw RF I/Q data in their native complex format, highlights the
challenges of RF-based fingerprinting in real-world settings,
and demonstrates novel directions for passively fingerprinting
devices without requiring any knowledge of the underlying
protocols. We believe that being able to fingerprint devices
in an agnostic and scalable way can greatly augment cur-
rent authentication schemes and defend against challenging
attacks such as relay attacks or credential theft. Our evaluation
explores numerous critical dimensions, yet many interesting
future research directions remain unexplored. We hope that
methodologies, network architectures, and experimental find-
ings presented in this work will spearhead more research in
the area. In summary, our main research contributions are:
• We present a novel device fingerprinting technique that
works on complex I/Q data representing raw RF wireless
signals. We build a novel deep complex-valued network that
is protocol-agnostic, designed to identify devices based on
learnable characteristics from passively captured transmitted
wireless signals. This is the first, to our knowledge, system
able to fingerprint devices using unprocessed raw signals in
a range of frequencies of interest.
• We detail a series of neural network architectures and
configurations, and explore their suitability for device fin-
gerprinting. We derive appropriate insights and highlight the
inherent limitations of certain architectures, which can help
guide future research.
• We provide an extensive experimental evaluation using
datasets from an externally organized red team. Our ex-
periments investigate multiple dimensions of signal-based
device fingerprinting and assess the impact of multiple
factors under different environmental settings and real-
world conditions that previous work has not explored. We
demonstrate the effectiveness of our system’s fingerprinting
capabilities under challenging and realistic scenarios, using
real-world, multi-device, open air captures of RF signals.
II. BACKGROUND AND DEPLOYMENT PREDICATES
A. RF Primer
We first introduce relevant background information that
facilitates comprehension of the following sections. This in-
cludes basic telecommunication terms and notions and techni-
cal details on the two signal families that we use throughout
this paper. As the methodologies involved in signal processing
are sufficiently complicated, we refer readers without back-
ground in the area to [19] for a more complete overview.
Baseband signals. Signals are encountered in this form be-
fore being transmitted or after the receiver removes the carrier
signal during the early stages of demodulation, centering the
received signal around 0Hz.
Modulation is the process by which a transmitter encodes
information so that it can be effectively and efficiently trans-
mitted. The main idea is to encode the information from a
baseband signal by utilizing a carrier signal of higher fre-
quency. Information is encoded by modifying one or more of
the carrier’s characteristics: amplitude, phase, and frequency.
I/Q data. Signals are commonly represented in a format
known as I/Q form [20]. This is based on a methodology of
representing a signal using a vector of complex numbers. The
’I’ stands for the in-phase component whereas the ’Q’ stands
for the quadrature or out-of-phase component. Analytically it
can be represented by the following equation:
S(t) = A cos θt+A sin θt→ S(t) = I +Qj
In essence any signal can be generated by a combination of
in-phase and out-of-phase components and, hence, it is widely
used in signal processing and telecommunications.
SDR. Software Defined Radios revolutionized the field
of telecommunications as they allowed for the reception and
transmission of RF signals with any modulation scheme and at
any frequency while offering the convenience of defining ev-
erything through software despite utilizing the same underlying
hardware. One of the key components behind this technology is
the quadrature mixer. The quadrature mixer can synthesize any
signal using two signals with a phase difference of 90 degrees,
and these quadrature signals can be conveniently expressed in
analytical form as I/Q data. Figure 11 in Appendix A depicts
the process of transmuting I/Q data to a modulated signal using
a quadrature modulator.
Channel. The medium through which the signal is trans-
mitted, which can greatly alter signals in transmission and have
a detrimental effect on them. A channel’s characteristics are of-
ten ephemeral as they change due to a variety of environmental
conditions, and the same signal transmitted through the same
medium at different times can differ drastically. This inherent
challenge is pertinent to our research goals, and we explore it
in depth during our evaluation.
SNR. Due to the transient nature of a channel’s conditions,
the Signal-to-Noise Ratio metric is useful in denoting the
quality of the received signal by quantifying how much of
a received signal is noise and what portion is actually useful.
Fig. 1: Spectrograms depicting WiFi and ADS-B signals
captured under different channel environments and SNR. The
outdoors WiFi signals depict the open air capture conditions.
Spectrogram. Captured transmissions can be visually rep-
resented as spectrograms. To obtain a spectrogram from raw
I/Q data, a Short Term Fourier Transform (STFT) [21] is
performed over the entire captured trace. The SFTF outcome
depicts the spectral content of the signal through time and
one can easily identify drastic changes, the effect of noise, or
different parts of the transmission. Figure 1 shows a collection
of spectrograms for both WiFi and ADS-B signals under
different conditions to highlight the aforementioned effects.
Plots (i) and (ii) show a WiFi signal captured from the same
device over two different days and (vi) depicts the signal
after a basebanding and low pass filtering operation. Since
the capture was conducted outdoors, the interference from
other channels/devices is evident in the first two plots. In
(iii) we show an unprocessed WiFi signal that was captured
indoors where the SDR basebanded the signal without using
an intermediate frequency (IF); one can notice that noise is
still present since the signal has not been filtered. Plots (iv),
(v) show both versions of ADS-B transmissions under different
SNR (the x-axes are different for the two signals as the short
version is almost half the transmission).
WiFi. WiFi signals are part of the 802.11 IEEE protocol
family. While many variations exist, in practice the most
frequently encountered follow the 802.11b and 802.11g spec-
ifications (which use a central frequency of 2.4GhZ) and the
newer 802.11n version (which utilizes the 5GhZ band). WiFi
signals utilize the Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing
(OFDM) modulation which encodes information not in one
carrier signal but in multiple sub-carriers, where each sub-
carrier can be modulated using amplitude, phase or frequency
modulation schemes such as 16QAM, 16QPSK etc. The in-
formation content in a WiFi signal can vary significantly in
size. We direct the interested reader to [22] for an excellent
resource with more information.
ADS-B. A protocol of choice used by air crafts and is
scheduled to replace most RADAR systems according to the
Federal Aviation Agency [23]. It is encountered in two forms,
either short or extended (64 or 120 µs). Apart from the header
and the CRC, short messages only contain a unique aircraft
identifier (24bits), whereas the extended version carries addi-
tional information on the altitude, position, heading, horizontal
and vertical velocity. ADS-B transmits at 1090MHz with
50KHz bandwidth or at 978MHz with 1.3MHz bandwidth.
The modulation employed in this protocol is referred to as
Pulse Position Modulation (PPM), which encodes data by
simply increasing or decreasing the width of the carrier pulses
according to the value of the modulating signal at a given
time. It is a much simpler modulation scheme than the one
used in WiFi signals and the messages transmitted are either
5 or 10 bytes. An important characteristic of this protocol is
that it is very robust to multipath effects and environmental
noise. A more detailed overview and description can be
found in [24]. While ADS-B packets contain a unique device
identifier, certain transceivers have the option for anonymous
mode where a randomized ID is sent [25]. Prior work has
discussed how ADS-B data can easily be spoofed to disrupt
air travel safety [26], [27]. As such, the ability to fingerprint
and identify transmitters without relying on identifiers has
significant operational value.
B. Deep Learning Primer
This section introduces the basic concepts required for
following the deep learning networks and methodologies dis-
cussed in this paper. Readers familiar with the field may
advance to the next section. An excellent detailed presentation
of foundational concepts can be found in [28].
CNN. Convolutional Neural Networks [29] perform ex-
ceptionally well at detecting spatial points of interest and
structural properties, and several variants have been used in
a plethora of applications with great success, such as face
and gender detection [30], semantic image segmentation [31],
speech recognition [32] and stock prediction [33]. The basic
idea behind a CNN is to perform a convolution operation
between a weight vector of a given size (often called a
kernel) and a subset of the input data, with the length of each
convolution being the size of the kernel. Convolutional layers
are almost always used in conjunction with pooling layers to
achieve dimensionality reduction without loss of information.
RNN. Recurrent Neural Networks are networks that excel
at modeling sequential or time series data. The core concepts
behind them are the context and temporal relations between
data points, potentially in different parts of the input. Two
advanced forms of RNNs enhance the concept of context by in-
troducing well-defined memory properties, namely Long Short
Term Memory Models (LSTM) and Gated Recurrent Units
(GRU). These advanced models allow the recurrent network
to “choose” and “memorize” parts of the context that are
significant for the model, emulating a form of memory. While
the mathematical models behind each variant are different,
both networks have been used in practice with significant
success and similar capabilities [34], [35], [36], [37].
Back Propagation Through Time. As recurrent networks
capture sequential properties and try to find temporal relations,
the gradient descent step during the back propagation phase
essentially attempts to link the current state with previous
states in time. This is referred to as Back Propagation Through
Time (BPTT) [38]. RNNs face the problem of vanishing or
exploding gradients for lengthy time sequences and while
LSTMs are known to be more robust they can still suffer from
the same problems albeit at much longer sequences [39].
Complex-valued inputs. Most networks currently used in
practice operate on real-valued data. However, many problems
are expressed in complex numbers, e.g., signals (RF or other-
wise). Down-converting complex numbers to either the real or
imaginary part limits the available information and introduces a
miss-match between the model and problem at hand. To intro-
duce complex-valued inputs and, thus, create complex-valued
networks that theoretically have higher representational power
(as they can express solutions in complex-valued manifolds)
one needs to address many theoretical challenges and provide
alternatives to elementary units such as activation units, or
properly initializing complex-valued weights in hidden layers.
Complex batch normalization. Data normalization is
commonly used for efficiently training in most types of deep
networks. However, when the underlying problem lies in the
complex domain, data requires special handling as outlined
in [14]. Briefly, one cannot perform two-way independent nor-
malization in the real and imaginary part of a complex number
as there is also information precisely in the relation of the real
and imaginary axes. This is highly evident if we consider the
polar representation of a complex number z = rιφ, where φ
is the angle the number forms in the complex plane with the
positive real axis, and is given by φ = atan2(IM(z), Re(z)).
If one operates on either the real or imaginary part indepen-
dently, thus disregarding any correlation, we can introduce an
affine transformation which is not equivalent to normalization.
To properly handle the normalization process, we treat the
complex numbers as 2D vectors and the process as 2D whiten-
ing. We scale the 0 centered data by the inverse square root
of their covariance matrix V (the existence of the inverse is
guaranteed by the Tikhonov regularization; see Appendix A4):
x˜ = (V)− 12 (x− E[x]),
where V is the 2x2 covariance matrix:
V =
(
Vrr Vri
Vri Vii
)
=
(
Cov(<(x),<(x)) Cov(<(x),=(x))
Cov(<(x),=(x)) Cov(<(x),<(x))
)
The complex batch normalization layer is defined as:
BN(x˜) = γx˜ + β, where γ =
(
γrr γri
γri γii
)
Complex activation units. As in the normalization case,
activation functions must also be adapted to handle complex-
valued numbers. Several activation units have been proposed
such as ModRelu [40], CReLU [14] and zReLU [41]. These
functions preserve differentiability, at least in part, to main-
tain compatibility with back-propagation. As shown in [42],
full complex differentiable functions are not strictly required.
While many activation functions have been proposed, we
evaluate the following complex activation functions:
CReLU = ReLU(<(z)) + ιReLU(=(z))
zReLU =
{
z ifθz ∈ [0, pi/2],
0 elsewhere
Complex weight initialization. Appropriate weight initial-
ization is often considered helpful for the training process of
networks. It can help avoid the risk of vanishing or exploding
gradients and facilitate a faster convergence. In the complex
case, as derived in [14], the variance of the weight vectors is
given by Var(W) = 2σ2, where σ is Rayleigh distribution’s only
parameter; σ can be selected according to any initialization
criterion such as those described in [43], [44]. Note that as the
variance is not affected by phase, one can initialize the phase
φ of W as φW ∼ U [−pi, pi].
C. Deployment Predicates
The techniques presented in this work can be applied to a
wide range of scenarios. Nonetheless, for ease of presentation
we will assume that role of an entity aiming to identify the
sources of wireless signals (be it electronic devices or air
crafts). We assume that this entity passively collects wireless
signals within a certain area, without interacting with or
actively probing the devices. Similarly we do not require the
user to interact with a specific resource. The only assumption
is that the user’s device is transmitting some form of wireless
signal; in our experimental evaluation we use WiFi and ADS-
B traces, but this could be applied to other types as well (e.g.,
Bluetooth, GSM, 4G, etc ). Depending on the scenario, the
application can include the deployment of multiple antennas
within a larger physical area (e.g., for authenticating devices
connecting to an organization’s restricted wireless network) or
may focus on a specific small space (e.g., for detecting rogue
access points using stolen certificates).
III. SYSTEM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
Here we present an overview of RF-DCN, and discuss the
motivation behind our design and implementation choices.
Design constraints. The main goal of RF-DCN is to
operate on raw I/Q data so as to decouple the fingerprinting ca-
pabilities of our system from protocol or software specificities
(which can differ across versions [11]) and implementation
flaws. It also removes the burden of manual analysis that
would otherwise be required if new or custom protocols were
encountered. To that end we limit all data preprocessing to
general RF methodologies (such as applying low or band pass
filtering) and data augmentation techniques that can be applied
to any RF signal regardless of protocol (such as decimation).
CDCN. We first develop a complex-valued DCN network
(Figure 2a) similar to the shallow MusicNet from the recent
work of Trabelsi et al. [14], which was successfully applied to
acoustic data. We draw inspiration from this network because
even though acoustic and RF signals are different in nature
(one is mechanical and the other electromagnetic) they share
many similarities. Both can be modeled as a 1D complex
vector of samples, and many of the techniques, methodologies
and signal processing theories are applicable to both in practice
(low/bandpass filtering, decimation, etc). This also poses as a
comparison baseline for our novel LSTM-based approach.
RDCN. Since RF signals can be expressed as a time series
and have temporal coherency, we hypothesize that networks
that capture such temporal features will perform well at ana-
lyzing RF data. Consider, for instance, the case of amplitude
modulation where voltage changes from a higher value to
a lower value must pass through intermediate values (albeit
ephemerally). The precise nature of this transition is based on
the device’s electronics and this is precisely what we aim to
capture. Our second complex network elevates LSTM layers,
and employs a custom build layer we call the “Sequencer”,
as shown in Figure 2b. A known problem for RNNs is the
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(a) Convolutional Deep Complex Network (CDCN) architecture.
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(b) Recurrent Deep Complex Network (RDCN) architecture.
Fig. 2: Convolutional Deep Complex Network (CDCN): the Complex Convolutional Layer combines both I/Q pairs in two mixed
channels (top). The Recurrent Deep Complex Network (RDCN) is based on the powerful LSTM variant; while initially the I/Q
pairs are in two different channels the Complex Linear layer binds them together, and its output contains two mixed channels
(bottom). The schematic was produced with PlotNeuralNet [45].
BPTT problem; as RF signals can expand to extremely large
time series ranging to several thousands of samples, simply
operating on a point to point basis is infeasible. While LSTM’s
memory mechanisms help alleviate the problem by providing
alternative ways for the gradient to flow back through time,
they can still break down under sufficiently large signals [39],
as the memory cells grow to crippling proportions. Drawing
upon the conclusions of Gers et al. [39] to combat this
problem we have designed the Sequencer layer, which splits
the signal -that is modeled as a 1D time sequence of I/Q pairs
into a number of smaller vectors. The generated vectors are
then served as inputs sequentially to the LSTM in a proper
temporal order as shown in Figure 4, allowing the LSTM to
“see” the same amount of data but over less timesteps. This
transmutation of a longer vector into a collection of smaller
vectors changes the nature of the signal by transforming it
into different dimensions. As such, the size and number of the
newly generated vectors are critical as they might not preserve
the qualities of the original signal.
A. Real, Imaginary and Mixed Data Channels
Due to limitations of the underlying frameworks, the fun-
damental data-holding structure (i.e., tensors) cannot contain
complex numbers. To overcome this our tensors contain the
real (“I”) component in one dimension and the imaginary (“Q”)
component in another, akin to [14]. Initially, our input channels
are clearly separated between real and imaginary components
containing real-valued float numbers. This separation ceases
once the data is pushed through the first layer. The linear,
convolutional layers operate on both channels utilizing the
equations described previously, and the output channels ex-
iting these layers contain two channels with data containing
information from both the real and imaginary parts.
These output channels no longer solely represent the real
and imaginary parts of the number, but are instead mixed
information-wise. To differentiate from the prior “pure” input
channels we refer to the new channels as “A” and “B”.
To illustrate the qualitative difference between these sets of
channels, consider the output of the complex linear layer:
LCW (h) =
[<(W · h)
=(W · h))
]
=
[
A -B
B A
]
·
[
x
y
]
(1)
The outcome of this equation contains values that are quali-
tatively mixed and stores them as:
• channel A= R ∗R− I ∗ I
• channel B= R ∗ I + I ∗R
Mathematically, the outcome of this operation is still real-
valued in one channel and imaginary in the other. However,
information-wise the channels contain mixed data since the
imaginary values are used in tandem with the real valued parts.
Output channels. The output of the network is contained
in two mixed channels A and B. Trabelsi et al. [14] utilize
the output of channel A, and discard the output of channel B
in the shallow version of their proposed network but utilize
both channels through a linear dense output layer in the deep
version of their model. Since we are working with novel RF
data we explore three possible configurations of the outputs so
as to identify the optimal way for leveraging the mixed output
channels: (i) only the output of channel A (per prior work),
(ii) we introduce parameters Ga and Gb and sum the channels,
allowing the network to modify the parameters and (iii) we
employ a convolutional layer for joining the two channels into
one output channel of identical dimensions. It is important
to note that while Wolter et al. [46] follow a similar scheme
for the gates that control the memory of the Complex GRU
that should not be confused with our parameters which act as
a weighting factor for the two output channels. Our results
show that both channels are actually used in practice and the
network keeps both parameters in close proximity.
B. Layers
Complex layers. We use the complex batch normalization,
complex convolutional, and complex linear layers proposed
by Trabelsi et al.[14]. The input of the initial convolutional
and linear layers is split in two channels that contain the
(purely) imaginary and real part in each channel. However,
as aforementioned, the output of these layers contains mixed
information from both imaginary and real parts of the signal.
Activation units. To identify the optimal activation unit we
evaluate both ZReLU and CReLu. After the initial complex
convolutional/linear layer the output channels contain mixed
information. We found that ZReLU, which activates on the
first quadrant of the Cartesian plane, is not optimal for the
mixed nature of the data and CReLU provides better results.
LSTM. Our LSTM layers are unmodified real-valued
LSTMs, but the input they receive is mixed. We utilize two
LSTMs in parallel and provide the A, B channels as input re-
spectively. The output used for the classification is the context
from each LSTM during the final step. The internal context
is preserved for the entire epoch and reinitialized to a clean
context at the start of each epoch. The computational graph is
preserved within each minibatch but detached -yet the context
values are still preserved across minibatches so as to avoid
backpropagation across minibatches. During our experiments
we found that the RDCN architecture was significantly harder
to train, corroborating the findings of [47].
Preprocessing step. Our data preprocessing is minimal and
comprises of: (i) basebanding the signals [19], and (ii) applying
a 3rd order Butterworth bandpass filter [48] with cutoffs
at 25KHz and 20MHz. Our insight behind the lower order
Butterworth filter is to allow a smooth cutoff and include po-
tential discriminating effects emanating from the imperfections
inherent to the transmitter’s filters. The precise lower value was
calibrated experimentally. No other data preprocessing or other
protocol-specific treatment takes place.
C. Data Augmentation
Existing methodologies for processing image or audio
data contain a multitude of data manipulation techniques for
creating new synthetic instances by increasing robustness and
reducing generalization errors. For instance, a well established
approach for creating synthetic image training data is to rotate
the image, scale it or add/remove noise. Prior work has shown
that such practices improve the network [49], [50], [51]. We
adapt common data augmentation practices and evaluate their
applicability and limitations in the realm of RF data.
Decimation. A widely used methodology in signal pro-
cessing is to reduce the computational load by keeping every
Mth sample of a signal where M is called the decimation
factor. In order to avoid aliasing a low pass filter must be
applied before the decimation operation. For neural networks
apart from reducing the computational load, decimation also
reduces the number of network parameters since the input
signal is reduced according to the decimation factor. In our
work decimation has the additional role of augmenting the
dataset since the decimated signals are used as extra samples.
The decimation factor must be an integer value and obey the
lower limit of the Nyquist theorem [52] to be able to correctly
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Fig. 4: Decimation with a factor of 2 generates two new
samples of half the original length (left). The Sequencer
converts the signal into a series of vectors (here a vector of 2
vectors) that are sequentially entered in the LSTM in proper
temporal order, i.e, the samples will be seen in the same order
as if the original signal was provided unprocessed (right).
reconstruct the signal. Decimation can be seen as reducing
the rate of sampling by a ratio equal to the decimation factor
M , thus the maximum ratio must be the number that allows
a sampling rate with at least Fs ≥ 2Fmax, where Fmax is
the maximum frequency required. For example in the case of
WiFi where the bandwidth is 20MHz the minimum required
sample rate is 40MSPS (Mega Samples Per Second); since
our sample rate is 100MSPS per channel and the factor M
must be an integer the only allowed value is two. Increasing
the decimation factor beyond that limit reduces the highest
frequency one may reconstruct, leading to potentially missed
information. To establish whether this constrain also applies
to the problem at hand (which is to fingerprint the transmitter
rather than faithfully reconstruct the signal) we add this
parameter to our hyperparameter exploration. Figure 4 (left)
shows an illustration of decimating a signal composed of 8 data
samples with a factor of two. We also adapted other common
data augmentation techniques but did not find them to be useful
in this context. We provide more info in Appendix B.
Randomized Cropping. Our main design goal is for RF-
DCN to be protocol-agnostic and to not learn software-level
characteristics. To guide the network away from latching onto
protocol identifiers, we crop each sample in every minibatch
into N parts and randomly choose, without replacement, one
part to train on. This approach forces the network towards
selecting features that are common in different parts of the
signal since it has to minimize the error for every part it
encounters during training. The same procedure is followed
for testing as well, and each test signal is fragmented into N
parts and a random piece is chosen for classification.
Both WiFi and ADS-B signals used in our evaluation, con-
tain identifiers that exist in predetermined positions and have
different sizes (see Figure 3 in Appendix A). In our current
experiments we find that N = 6 provides a good balance
between having a sufficient part of the signal and making sure
that the majority of the generated random crops do not contain
any unique identifier. Our technique is protocol agnostic as we
do not make assumptions on the precise location of the unique
identifier in the signal, choosing a random part when training
or testing. In other words, during our experiments 83.3% of
each testing and training signal is randomly discarded, which
prevents the system from latching on to identifiers without
us revealing information to the system about the position of
the identifier within a specific type of packet (as that would
implicitly teach the system information about each protocol).
By following this scheme, the network is forced to identify the
device without learning superficial features that correspond to
identifiers, and it does so regardless of where such an identifier
is located in the signal. The results solidify our hypothesis
that our approach captures the essential characteristics of each
device; if the networks had learned to predominantly discern a
signal through its identifier, the accuracy results reported with
random signal cropping would arguably be significantly lower
than those presented in this work.
IV. DATASET DESCRIPTION
Here we provide details of the datasets used throughout
our experiments, which are comprised of signal traces captured
under a variety of conditions over a period of 13 days. This
was part of our external evaluation by a red team (they were
in charge of creating the dataset – performers were not part
of IRB-related processes). Data is stored in the SigMF format,
which we describe in Appendix A2.
The RF signals were captured from 96 different Tektronix
RSA5106B each equipped with a HG2458-08LP antenna, and
four USRP B210 SDRs. Signals were captured at 100MSPS1
which is well beyond the minimum sample rate required to
reconstruct even the most demanding signal category in our
dataset, i.e., WiFi signals. Finally, the captures were conducted
with both vertical (90%) and horizontal (10%) antenna po-
larization, 5% of the signals are captured in both forms. The
captured signals have variable lengths according to the protocol
and the message type. ADS-B signals have a length of 6,400
(64µs short) or 12,000 (120µs extended) whereas for WiFi
length is extremely variable (as per specification), ranging from
a few thousand I/Q pairs to 272K I/Q pairs in our data. As
our goal is to create a system without any knowledge of the
underlying protocols, we perform our experiments with vectors
of 6,400 samples (I/Q pairs) for both WiFi and ADS-B. We do
not differentiate between protocols by adding more data points
for WiFi signals, as that would increase the informational
content the system sees for one type and could guide it to
separate signals due to superficial characteristics (e.g., different
1The overall sampling rate is 200MSPS split between both “I” and “Q”
components leading to 100 MSPS per channel.
signal lengths). At our sample rate 6,400 complex data points
correspond to to 64µs of signal capture.
WiFi-1. This dataset spans all 13 days and data was
captured in both indoor and outdoor settings. It includes 4TB
of signals that have been collected from 53,853 unique devices
from a variety of manufactures. The majority of devices are
Apple iPhones (∼30%) and the rest are from different man-
ufacturers and types (smartphones, laptops, tablets, drones).
The signals captured are mainly from 2.4Ghz but a significant
portion (≥ 20%) is also from 5Ghz emitting devices; some
devices transmit in both bands. Device labeling was done
using the MAC addresses, as MAC address randomization was
disabled to facilitate the labelling process of such a massive
and diverse set of devices. The real-world capturing process
has also resulted in additional interference and “noise” in the
captured signals from other protocols that transmit at those
ranges (e.g., Bluetooth), which poses an additional challenge
for protocol-agnostic fingerprinting. Furthermore, the open air
capturing was designed to eliminate or minimize environmen-
tal sources of bias that could assist the fingerprinting systems.
Specifically, while the deep learning models could potentially
learn environmental factors or location-specific artifacts, this
was counteracted by: (i) the weather and other environmental
factors (e.g., physical obstacles that alter signals) changing
over the course of 13 days, (ii) using devices that are not
stationary (as those commonly used in prior studies) but
mobile devices during normal operation where they change
multiple locations per day while transmitting their signals,
and (iii) the antennas being deployed in different locations
which also changed through time. As such, this dataset allows
for the evaluation of our proposed models across different
capturing conditions and for large-scale deployments where
many devices need to be tracked.
WiFi-2. This dataset is formed from a set of 19 identical
devices with the same firmware version installed. The signals
were collected in a lab (indoors) and the devices were set up
to transmit the same data and configured with the same MAC
address. The dataset includes ∼200K signals and requires
17GB of storage. Labeling was done manually: traffic was
captured from one device and labelled, then the next device
was used and labelled, etc. It is important to note that while all
devices have the same MAC address, and devices transmitted
the same data, ephemeral identifiers in the traffic will differ
(e.g., timestamps). The main purpose of this dataset is to
demonstrate that RF-DCN does not learn specific identifiers
and is unaffected by other software or content-related artifacts,
but is instead capable of identifying the artifacts left by a
device’s unique hardware imperfections in a transmitted signal.
ADSB-1. This dataset was collected over a span of 10
days and contains approximately an equal amount of short
and extended signals. The transmitters were airplanes and we
have collected signals from 10,404 unique sources. The cap-
tured data contains a plethora of different airplane positions,
velocities, altitude and SNR values. Labeling was done using
the unique 24bit identifier encoded in each message. The entire
dataset includes 3.5M signals and is approximately 7TB. The
outdoors collection took place at a single location.
Realistic environmental conditions. Numerous factors
affect the quality of a recorded signal; channel effects (e.g.,
multipath, hysterisis), environmental effects (e.g., outdoors vs
indoors), the type of transmitter (e.g., cellphones, UAV), cap-
ture conditions (e.g., antenna polarization), will vary in reality.
Our dataset was generated so as to contain signals representing
all of the above conditions. We believe that this plethora
of different capture parameters is a critical requirement for
evaluating a system’s ability to fingerprint devices in practice,
as ideal indoor-lab settings alone are not indicative of actual
deployment settings. Furthermore, the signal captures can con-
tain multiple concurrent transmissions from different devices,
thus, introducing additional noise. Another important feature is
that our training and testing data are not from a contiguous time
window (apart from WiFi-2), further increasing the realism
of our testing scenarios. Prior studies have evaluated their
proposed systems using datasets that reflected some but not
all of the aforementioned parameters. To our knowledge, we
are the first to present a study that experimentally evaluates a
system using a dataset that contains signals captured in such
diverse conditions and quantifies their effect.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Here we provide an extensive evaluation that explores
RF-DCN’s performance under different environmental factors
and across multiple dimensions of our model’s design and
implementation. The combinations of factors and the specific
details (e.g., number of training and testing samples) in each
experiment were dictated by a red team evaluation process
organized externally (we have provided more information to
the PC chairs). All the experiments presented, unless otherwise
noted, were performed on captured signals with a duration of
64µs represented by 1D vectors of 6,400 complex numbers. In
all experiments the testing and training data are from different
transmissions. The reported accuracy in each case denotes
the percentage of target devices that were identified correctly,
thus, presenting a lower bound of the actually accuracy of our
models. For instance, consider an example where the test signal
capture for device A also contains background transmissions
from a device B which is one of the other devices used in
the experiment. If our system labels the test signal as “Device
B” we will count that as a misclassification, despite Device B
being one of the classes and present in the capture.
Hardware specifications. Experiments were performed on
a Supermicro SuperServer 1029GQ-TVRT equipped with 2
Intel Xeon Bronze 3104 (6 cores at 1.7GHz each) with 96GB
of DDR4 RAM and two Nvidia Tesla V100 SXM2 GPUs with
16GB of VRAM each. All of the architectures occupied a
maximum of 8GB on the GPU; the multiple units enabled the
concurrent training of different models and reduced the time
required for the hyperparameter exploration.
Models. We present two real-valued conventional net-
works, namely ANN and CNN, and two complex-valued
networks, namely CDCN and RDCN shown in Figure 2.
We use the real-valued networks as baseline for evaluating
the potential of the complex-valued variants and drawing a
baseline of comparison using all the information present in a
signal (properly bound using the covariance matrices, and the
usage of complex weights and complex activation units).
Machine learning configuration. The networks were
trained over 100 epochs with a batch size of 32. We found that
adaptive learning rate annealing is helpful and, thus, reduce
the learning rate by 1e−1 after every 10 epochs where the
network fails to improve its validation accuracy. We also allow
early stopping once the learning rate reaches 1e−7. The results
we report in this section represent the best generalization a
ccuracy over 100 epochs or if the early stopping criterion
is met. This falls in line with evaluation approaches in the
deep learning literature when handling large and complicated
neural networks (e.g.,[53], [54], [55], [56]). This is standard
practice for obtaining unbiased error estimations when facing
significant computational requirements for training such net-
works and exploring different architectures, configurations, and
datasets, as opposed to k-fold validation approaches that are
common for other machine learning techniques. We evaluated
both Cross Entropy and Binary Cross Entropy and found
that the later improves the convergence of the model and
produces better results. We evaluated both the Adam optimizer
and SGD in a subset of the experiments and found that
Adam with amsgrad disabled is superior. Real-valued layers
are initialized using uniform distribution based on the work
by Glorot et al. [43], while complex-valued layers leverage
complex weight initialization. We performed no normalization
and standardization of the data during preprocessing, and relied
on the first Batch Normalization layer that performs a similar
computation. The hyperparameters that we explored include
several variables such as the optimal decimation factor, the
optimal sequencer time step and the number of hidden units in
the RDCN layer. The hyperparameter space was explored using
Spearmint [57], and the optimal values obtained corresponded
to the best accuracy using a validation dataset comprised of
both WiFi and ADS-B devices. Our methodology and details
on the obtained hyperparameters can be found in Appendix C.
Hyperparameter exploration takeaways. While our ex-
periments show that the hyperparameters greatly affect the
learning capabilities and accuracy of each architecture, our
exploration reveals that the RDCN network is the most “sensi-
tive” to hyperparameters. Its performance can range from not
learning anything (i.e., getting results equivalent to randomly
guessing the source of the signal) to obtaining highly accurate
results. For RDCN we find that the most crucial parameter,
besides the learning rate, is the number of time steps produced
by the sequencer; this indicates that restructuring the 1D
time series vector into a tensor of vectors directly influences
the representation of the signal, effectively changing an N-
length one dimensional signal to an N/M vector length of
M-dimensional vectors. The best results were obtained for a
length that corresponded to approximately 1µs worth of data,
given our sampling rate that corresponds to 100 values per
timestep (or 50 when a factor 2 decimation is used).
A. Signal Preprocessing
First we explore how preprocessing the signal prior to
feeding it to RF-DCN affects accuracy. To that end we compare
the accuracy obtained when the different neural architectures
are fed completely unfiltered data as opposed to data that
has undergone generic and standard telecommunications pre-
processing, namely baseband and passband filtering. Figure 5
shows that filtering and basebanding are crucial for the WiFi
signals. Apart from higher susceptibility to outdoor conditions
and channel effects, the inherent ability of WiFi transmitters to
broadcast in different communication channels mandates the
TABLE I: Accuracy in regards to temporal relation of the collected signals, using the WiFi-1 dataset.
T-train T-test Environment Classes Samples (Train) Samples (Test) ANN CNN CDCN RDCN RDCN (top5)
Day-1 Day-1 Indoors 100 800 200 39% 66% 74% 72% 90%
Day-1 Day-1 Outdoors 100 800 200 38% 52% 66% 63% 89%
Day-1 Day-1 Both 100 800 200 32% 61% 71% 70% 91%
Day-1 Day-2 Both 50 100 25 2% 3% 7% 10% 30%
Day-1,2 Day-3 Both 65 218 54 4% 10% 12% 21% 44%
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Fig. 5: Preprocessing effect on accuracy, for 100 devices.
While all networks benefit from preprocessing, CDCN and
RDCN are more robust to learning from unprocessed RF data.
use of basebanding. Interestingly, we find that the complex-
valued networks are able to “see through” the clutter induced
by concurrent WiFi transmissions and ambient noise, locating
the intended signal even in the raw pre-processed signal case
where the signal is not even basebanded and the captured
instance between training and testing could be in different
central frequencies. It is evident however that performing
at least the basic signal processing can greatly improve the
accuracy, especially in the weaker real-valued networks.
B. Multi-protocol networks
Apart from the positive effect of filtering, Figure 5 also
indicates the challenge of building a network for signals from
multiple protocols. When the network is trained on a mixture
of two signal types, performance is lower than the average
accuracy of the two stand-alone networks (which one might
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Fig. 6: Accuracy comparison of two stand-alone single-
protocol networks versus a protocol-agnostic approach for all
signal sources. The red lines denote the “ideal” accuracy,
which is the average of the two stand-alone networks.
hope to achieve). To further explore this effect we consider
the following experiment. We assume a scenario where 50
WiFi and 50 ADS-B sources exist, and want to quantify the
performance impact of a protocol-agnostic approach where no
explicit information is provided to the network for differenti-
ating between them. Specifically, we quantify the accuracy of
two stand-alone versions of RF-DCN, each trained and tested
on 50 classes of a single protocol, and compare it to a protocol-
agnostic version that has to handle all 100 classes. As can
be seen in Figure 6, the multi-protocol network is “weighed
down” by the WiFi protocol and is not able to reach the average
accuracy of the two standalone networks. It is important to note
that while the increase in the number of classes from 50 to 100
can affect the performance, the presence of multiple types of
protocols has a dominant impact (as in Figure 5). We find that
the RDCN architecture not only achieves the highest accuracy,
but also presents the smallest accuracy loss for the multi-
protocol system, which further highlights its effectiveness and
suitability for challenging settings where multiple types of
signals are emitted from sources.
C. Channel effect: spatial implications
Due to the transient nature of the channel through which a
signal is being transmitted, we explore how RF-DCN’s accu-
racy changes based on the spatial conditions of the different
signals. We break down our experiments on the WiFi-1 dataset
in the first two rows of Table I. We start by using indoor
data that was captured on the same day, for 100 different
devices. Our RDCN network is able to correctly identify the
device in 72% of the cases, while the correct device is in
the top five for 92% of the tests. When we replicate this
experiment using signals that were captured outdoors, accuracy
drops by 4-9%, due to the impact environmental factors have
on the transmitted signals. When training and testing using
a mixture of indoor/outdoor signals RF-DCN performance is
roughly in the middle between the indoor and outdoor settings.
Once again, RDCN vastly outperforms real-valued networks,
demonstrating our system’s robustness against environmental
factors – if our model relied on location-specific artifacts for
identifying devices its performance would have significantly
deteriorated in this experiment.
D. Channel effect: temporal implications
Prevalent ambient environmental differences greatly affect
the morphology of each signal as shown in Figure 1. Apart
from the effect natural environmental changes have (e.g. rain/-
sunny day) ephemeral factors such as vehicles or obstacles
may induce multipath or other effects. Finally some protocols
like WiFi allow for transmission in different communication
sub-channels according to conditions in the RF spectrum in
the devices’ vicinity, for example if more than one device
broadcasts in the same channel. As such, we also experiment
with a more challenging and realistic scenario where the
training data is collected during one day and the testing data
is from a different day, using a smaller number of classes.
The last two rows in Table I contain the experiments used
to estimate the effect of these conditions. When we train on
one day and test using a different one, all the aforementioned
challenges are reflected in our results as even the RDCN
architecture obtains only a 10% accuracy with the correct
answer being in the top five 30% of the time. The real-
valued networks learn nothing as their accuracy is equivalent to
random selection. When we train on signals from two different
days the network appears to learn and discard the channel
effects and create more robust signal features, since testing on
a different day now achieves an increase in accuracy with the
RDCN rising to 21%. While the other architectures improve
as well, they remain considerably less accurate.
It is important to note that while we refer to Days 1,2,3 for
ease of presentation, the data is not from three specific days
but can span the entire 13 days. For example, the data used
for one device might be from the first, sixth and eleventh day,
while for a different device it might be from the second, third,
and seventh day of the collection period. This allows us to truly
stress test our system under different environmental settings.
In our opinion, this experiment highlights perhaps the toughest
challenge in operating with raw I/Q data. Previous work that
relied on protocol-specific techniques by extracting attributes
(e.g., constellation phase-shift) obfuscated this obstacle since
sophisticated protocol-specific signal processing techniques
can rectify these effects. The fact that the RDCN network
seems to be able to learn the channel effects within such a
complicated domain using signals captured from different days
is an encouraging result for the feasibility of protocol-agnostic
fingerprinting in realistic settings.
E. Channel effect: signal-to-noise implications
As the devices being monitored are likely to be in an
external setting, the quality of the signal can be affected
by environmental factors resulting in varying levels of noise.
In this set of experiments we aim to investigate how RF-
DCN’s performance is affected using datasets with different
signal-to-noise ratios. We train our models with 100 classes
using an equal number of training and testing samples (525)
that were captured over a mix of different days. We break
down our data into three different levels of SNR (Low ≤2dB,
2dB<Med<5dB and High ≥5dB). To make conditions more
TABLE II: Accuracy when using different subsets of ADSB-1
with varying levels of SNR ratios.
Train Test ANN CNN CDCN RDCN RDCN (top5)
Low Med 1% 98% 100% 100% 100%
Low High 75% 99% 99% 100% 100%
Med Low 85% 85% 98% 99% 100%
Med High 99% 100% 99% 100% 100%
High Low 27% 26% 99% 99% 100%
High Med 78% 78% 99% 100% 100%
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Fig. 7: Consistency of neural architectures over ten runs on
the same testing and training datasets.
challenging we experiment with testing and training combina-
tions that have different SNR levels, as shown in Table II. The
complex-valued networks both achieve accuracy higher than
98% and our results show that they are unaffected by different
SNRs. The RDCN network achieves almost 100% accuracy in
all settings. The real-valued networks perform relatively better
in settings where the testing data is of higher quality than
the training but suffer when attempting to recognize signals
of lower quality when trained on signals of higher quality.
The most indicative such case is shown when the training
used signals with High SNR and the testing occurred on Low
SNR with ANN and CNN both achieving an accuracy of less
than 27%. We observe an interesting relation between this
experiment and the one comparing filtered and raw signals;
in both experiments the complex-valued networks appear to
be able to “see through” the noise and extract robust and
meaningful features whereas the real-valued networks are more
susceptible to superficial effects induced by noise.
Model Reliability. During this experiment we encountered
a discrepancy in the ANN model, shown in the first row
of Table II. To further investigate this, we performed 10
runs for each architecture as shown in Figure 7. We observe
that the ANN network has a mean value of 54.1% with a
standard deviation of 36.7 whereas the other networks remain
consistent. When the ANN performed poorly it suffered from
the first epoch, indicating that this issue stems from weight
initialization. The limitations of this simplistic, yet parameter-
rich, model are also evident when the number of devices
increases and it completely fails to scale, as discussed next.
F. Class size effect
We explore how our system fares when the number of
classes increases. As Figure 8 shows, we run three sets of
experiments where RF-DCN is required to differentiate be-
tween 100, 500, and 1000 sources. These experiments evaluate
our system using an equal mix of data from both the WiFi-
1 and ADSB-1 datasets, in all setups we use 218 signals for
each device for training and 54 for testing. One can easily
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Fig. 8: RF-DCN’s accuracy for different number of classes.
observe that accuracy diminishes as the number of classes
increase. Interestingly it does so in a non-linear fashion, with
the RDCN achieving an accuracy of about 82% for 100 devices
and dropping to 72% and 62% for 500 and 1,000 classes
respectively. It is also evident that the real-valued networks
fail to produce models with sufficient descriptive power to
follow the increase in cardinality, even though they have more
parameters than the CDCN architecture. Finally we observe
a complete breakdown of the ANN and a more rapid decline
of the real-valued CNN when compared to its corresponding
complex-valued CDCN. The decrease in accuracy due to an
increase in cardinality is known and expected [58].
G. Learning hardware imperfections
If the data processing methodology is not designed cor-
rectly then the models tend to latch onto (software-level)
identifiers as opposed to the hardware characteristics of the
transmitting device. To further demonstrate the feasibility of
creating fingerprints from the unique hardware imperfections
that arise during a device’s manufacturing process, our next
experiment aims to stress test our system. Specifically, we
leverage the WiFi-2 dataset obtained from 19 identical smart-
phones flashed with the same firmware version, configured
with the same link-layer identifier (i.e., MAC address) and
transmitting the same data. We present the results in Table III.
To avoid latching on to either ephemeral or unique identifiers
we cut each signal in 6 parts and perform classification
using one randomly selected segment. Each training sample
comprises less than 17% of the original signal, disrupting the
continuity of the transmission, which leads to two primary
benefits; it increases the diversity of the dataset and guides the
network towards finding features that identify the device based
on the signal itself. Simply latching onto identifiers would
lead to poor performance in this experiment. In our current
setup, our random segments are approximately 10µs worth of
transmission or 1033 data points (out of the 6400 originally).
This fragmentation prevents latching onto ephemeral or unique
identifiers wherever they may be located in the signal, without
requiring prior knowledge of where they may be located. This
allows our methodology to be applied to any protocol.
As can be seen in Table III, this has a detrimental effect on
all the networks except RDCN, as its accuracy remains within
2-4% of when provided with the entire signal. This also shows
that our cropping methodology prevents the models from using
secondary protocol features (e.g., timestamps) as a discerning
TABLE III: Accuracy when using random signal fragments to
prevent networks from learning software-level identifiers.
Dataset Classes ANN CNN CDCN RDCN RDCN (t5)
WiFi-2 19 21% 26% 27% 99% 100%
ADSB-1 100 1% 15% 37% 98% 100%
WiFi-1 100 2% 26% 24% 69% 90%
Mix 100 15% 34% 36% 80% 93%
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Fig. 9: Performance of different architectures. (D) denotes the
use of decimation with a factor of 2.
signal since, if that was the case, all the models would continue
to exhibit high accuracy.We believe that superiority of our
model is due to the existence of sufficient gated memory cells
in the RDCN layer and its ability to learn features in context.
Once the signal is cropped and fed to the network its various
parts stem from different transmission phases (i.e., preamble,
transient states, payload-data transmission, checksum etc). The
morphology of the signal in these different phases differs
drastically as seen in Fig 3, and the RDCN network’s ability to
memorize features and work in context is the crucial difference
to the other architectures that struggle with this diversity. This
robustness, derived from capturing the essential transitional
imperfections of the original transmitting device, will allow
an authentication system to reject impersonating devices that
have spoofed identifiers (e.g., MAC address) even if they are
using stolen credentials or certificates.
H. System Performance
Figure 9 depicts the processing time required to train
a mixed dataset over a single epoch, and the parameters
contained by the model. We find that the number of parameters
does not always correlate with the time required to process
the data, as is evident for the ANN that has almost double the
parameters compared to CDCN yet takes less than a quarter
of the time for processing. This computational load, which is
independent of the number of parameters, exhibits an inverse
correlation to the accuracy of the networks. We also include
measurements from our decimation experiment, in which the
signals are decimated with a factor of two. Decimation vastly
reduces the number of parameters and even though it leads
to a signal half the size, the number of parameters is less
than one third of the original. RDCN is the “heaviest” model
containing 30M parameters, down from 92.3M. As we use
all the decimated samples instead of just one, we elevate
decimation from a computation-reducing technique to a data-
augmentation strategy as well. While this improves accuracy, it
increases the processing time required by the complex-valued
networks, indicating the computational mismatch between the
real and the complex-valued counterparts.
Figure 10 plots RF-DCN’s testing duration for each phase.
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Fig. 10: Time required for each testing subphase (RDCN).
We use RDCN and conduct 100 runs on an idle server. Our
dataset includes 11,200 signals from 100 classes, amounting to
a 1.7G testing dataset. Here the model has already been trained
and we are interested in the time required for the different
phases required for testing. It is evident that computation is
dominated by the time required to pre-process and then test the
data, requiring between 23-33 and 29-33 seconds respectively.
This experiment reflects a scenario where the attacker monitors
an area with 100 signal sources and aims to classify them.
In a scenario where RF-DCN is interacting with a single
device, e.g., for authenticating a device connecting to an access
point, verifying the device would require approximately 0.5
seconds which is a reasonable requirement for bootstrapping
authenticated communication between the two endpoints.
VI. RELATED WORK
Fingerprinting. Numerous prior studies have proposed
approaches for fingerprinting devices, with browser fingerprint-
ing attracting much attention due to the ubiquitous presence
of browsers [1], [7], [6], [4], [59], [3], [60]. Fingerprinting
work, however, is not exclusive to browsers. Kohno et al. [9]
introduced the notion of remotely fingerprinting a specific
physical device over the network by inspecting packet headers
and identifying the clock skew due to the hardware charac-
teristics of a given device. Several subsequent studies have
explored alternative approaches for detecting clock skew or
other protocol-specific features [61], [62], [63], [64], [65]. Brik
et al. [10] demonstrated that hardware imperfections can be
leveraged as successful fingerprinting features; however their
approach relied on protocol-specific information since during
the last steps of demodulation one needs to know the utilized
modulation scheme in order to estimate the difference from the
ideal expected symbol constellation. Such approaches, while
accurate, rely on protocol-specific noticeable imperfections
that need to be manually identified and extracted using hand-
crafted techniques which is problematic for unknown proto-
cols. It is also important to note that their data was collected
from an indoor testbed with statically placed transmitters –
in practice a fingerprinting system would face significantly
harsher conditions that affect performance, as demonstrated
by our experiments. Also, their data was collected using one
receiver which can prove problematic in realistic settings (see
Section VII). Such limitations are common in this line of
research (e.g. [66]). Dey et al. [8] argued that the physical
imperfections of smartphones’ accelerometer sensors rendered
devices fingerprintable, as do the audio components [67].
In contrast to prior work we propose and develop a widely
applicable fingerprinting approach, which presents a paradigm
shift as it removes many assumptions and practical limitations
that affected prior techniques. Specifically our work differs
across multiple dimensions. First, our system is fully passive
and does not require any form of interaction with the user or
the target device. Second, our approach is completely protocol-
agnostic and does not require any information about the
underlying protocols, operating system or applications running.
As a result, our proposed system is not affected by differences
in software implementations across platforms or different
versions, changes to the device’s software (e.g., updates), or
the use of custom protocols. Moreover, we present an extensive
experimentation that explores the effect of multiple dimensions
of the data collection and model creation process. Finally, our
system design guides the neural network towards learning the
effect of the device’s hardware on the transmitted signal, thus
overcoming obstacles presented by software-level defenses.
Complex-valued networks. Trabelsi et al. [14] laid the
theoretical foundations for using complex-valued networks and
proposed appropriate building blocks such as complex batch
normalization and complex weight initialization to facilitate
training with complex data. Wolter et al. [46] subsequently
introduced and successfully trained a complex-enabled GRU
and showed that it exhibits both stability and competitiveness.
Deep learning in RF. Recent papers [68], [69], [70]
highlighted the potential benefits of using deep learning for sig-
nal processing as well as tackling fundamental problems like
channel estimation [68], [70], modulation classification [69]
even directly recovering symbols without demodulation [68];
all these networks rely on real valued networks and treat the
naturally complex data as two real valued channels. The au-
thors of [69], [70] stated the lack of complex-valued networks
as an open research question and highlighted the mismatch
between the common use of complex numbers in almost all
signal processing algorithms and the real-valued nature of the
networks. O’Shea and Hoydis [69] identified some crucial
problems such as the non-holomorphic nature of common
activation functions, which was addressed in [14].
In an independent concurrent study, Restuccia et al. [18]
have proposed the use of deep learning for fingerprinting
devices based on RF signals. However, their study presents
multiple significant limitations compared to our work. First,
their system relies on protocol-specific processing of the
signal, which introduces an important deployment constraint
compared to our protocol-agnostic design. Next, their system
works with real-valued data, as opposed to our complex-
valued data approach, which inherently results in a loss of
information during the down-converting process. Moreover,
their system is built on top of a CNN which, as demonstrated
by our experimental evaluation, is considerably less accurate
– our RDCN architecture outperformed the CNN across all
experiments. Perhaps the most critical limitation is that they
provide the entire signal for training and testing; as we
highlighted in our experiments, that guides the CNN towards
learning the device identifiers (e.g., MAC address or aircraft
ID) as opposed to actual hardware imperfections. Next, the
majority of their experiments is conducted with a very small
number of classes; their largest experiment includes numbers
for up to 500 classes but, as shown in our Figure 8, the
CNN architecture’s accuracy deteriorates significantly for more
devices. Finally, they train their WiFi and ADS-B networks
separately, whereas we experiment with multi-protocol sys-
tems where the networks are fed both types of signals without
any prior knowledge of the underlying protocols. Overall,
while their work presents similarities with ours, we believe
that our paper presents significant advantages for practical
deployment, while also demonstrating superior accuracy under
more challenging scenarios. We also explore the effect of
many practical dimensions of the data collection and network
training processes that are omitted in their work.
VII. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
Deployment. Our techniques can be deployed in a de-
fensive capacity in multiple scenarios ranging from passively
authenticating devices [71], [72], [73], [74] to detecting unau-
thorized devices in restricted areas [75] or unmasking spoofed
transmissions (e.g., “wormhole” attacks [76]). Another poten-
tial application is detecting the illegitimate use of credential-
s/certificates from unauthorized transmitters.
Agnostic vs generalizable techniques. An interesting
related line of work explores using a range of mathematical
and statistical tools that are broadly applicable across pro-
tocols, such as the work Danev et al. [13], [12] or Klein
et al. [77]. The main difference between our work and the
above is that we explore the feasibility of fingerprinting without
knowledge of the modulation or the carrier frequencies. While
our system’s accuracy does indeed benefit from doing generic
preprocessing, our system works in a completely agnostic
manner given a capture of signals within a given frequency
range; it also handles devices that transmit at multiple different
frequency ranges, without any “guiding” information provided
to the system. In contrast while these prior methods are indeed
generalizable and applicable across protocols, they require the
ability to locate the signal and move it to an IF while filtering
and clearing the signal sufficiently to extract the statistical or
mathematical properties used in defining the fingerprint.
Hardware-based bypassing. While our technique is in-
herently robust to OS and software level attempts of subver-
sion, attackers could try to bypass it using hardware-based
approaches and trying to mimic the physical characteristics
that were learned by our network for a specific device. This
presents several significant challenges in practice, and would
require considerable effort and money [10], if at all feasible.
Danev et al.[78] explored two attacks for circumvent-
ing physical authentication systems: (i) a feature replication
scheme for bypassing modulation-based schemes, and (ii)
using a high quality signal generator to faithfully reconstruct a
captured signal and deceive low-level physical authentication
schemes such as transient-based approaches. The first attack
is ineffective against our system since modulation features are
irrelevant; the second, more powerful attack could potentially
trick our system within lab conditions. In their evaluation
they captured and replicated signals in a lab environment with
devices placed on a tripod 30cm away from the receiver. In
a realistic scenario, capturing a signal in a given location
would consist of transmissions that are affected by the given
channel and would be re-transmitted in the channel of the
new location, which would adversely affect the re-transmitted
signal. The spectrum conditions at the new location might also
affect the re-transmitted signal in ways that the authors did
not explore. Consider capturing a WiFi signal at channel 1;
when re-transmitting at the relay location prevalent spectrum
conditions may contain other WiFi devices transmitting at
channel 1, thus, inducing conflicts. Therefore, while relay
transmission from high-end quality hardware could pose a
threat to our fingerprinting scheme, significant experimentation
is required for exploring the feasibility of such an attack
under realistic non-lab conditions. As such, we argue that our
proposed techniques present a robust augmentation to existing
authentication (and other defensive) schemes.
Scalability. The limitations on softmax-based classifica-
tion, also referred to as the “softmax bottleneck”, have been
studied extensively in the work of Yang et al. [58]. Soft-
max adaptations like Sigsoftmax [79] might allow for higher
cardinalities. Discriminatory schemes such as Siamese net-
works [80] can facilitate an open set classification strategy,
providing robustness in the face of a large number of classes.
Our RDCN and CDCN networks can be retrofitted to power a
Siamese architecture with the appropriate loss function; finding
the appropriate loss metric for the comparison of RF complex
data is a challenging and interesting problem.
Signal types. In our experimental evaluation we used WiFi
and ADS-B signals collected both in the wild and in laboratory
settings. Common user devices also use other signal families
and protocols such as GSM and 4G. As such, in the future we
plan to experiment with other prevalent signal types; however,
given that RF-DCN works on raw data and is agnostic of the
underlying protocols we believe that our techniques can be
directly applied to a wide variety of wireless signals.
Model transferability. Similarly to how the transmitters
leave a unique fingerprint on signals, which is the motivating
observation behind RF-DCN, the receiving hardware may also
uniquely affect the signal. As such, in scenarios where the
training and testing data have been collected by different
devices a model’s accuracy could be impacted. In the datasets
used in our experiments the testing and training data was
collected by multiple receivers and antennas. However, as the
datasets do not have labels regarding the capturing device/an-
tenna, we were unable to quantify this effect. We consider
the in-depth exploration of the transferability of models across
different monitoring devices as part of our future work. Given
our current results we believe that leveraging multi-antenna
or multi-device monitoring setups, where signals are collected
from several receivers with different polarizations, can lead to
RF-DCN learning the imperfections of the transmitting devices
while “ignoring” the receiving hardware’s effect.
Model interpretability. This study presents the first ex-
ploration on the feasibility of using deep complex models for
fingerprinting devices based on their raw RF transmissions.
Our extensive experimental evaluation demonstrates that such
techniques are well suited for such tasks. While we have
designed our novel models based on specific domain-based
observations and well-defined design goals, we consider an
in-depth exploration of these network architectures that decon-
structs and interprets their predictions (e.g., using LRP [81])
an important aspect of our future work.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we demonstrated the effectiveness of novel
complex-valued networks, as they can produce powerful mod-
els able to express fingerprints that uniquely identify devices
based on the wireless signals they transmit. Specifically, we
presented a system that can identify artifacts ingrained in the
wireless signals due to the imperfections inherent in each
transmitter’s circuitry. One of our main motivations was to
explore the feasibility of building an RF-based fingerprinting
system that can act as an additional factor of authentication,
able to defend against powerful attacks such as impersonation,
digital certificate theft, or relay attacks. Our prototype demon-
strates that such a system can be readily deployed and operate
within realistic environments and without constraints on the
type of signal that devices need to transmit, knowledge of the
underlying protocol or software implementations. Through our
extensive experimental evaluation we highlighted the challeng-
ing nature of this task, and quantified the effect of different
factors across multiple dimensions of the testing and training
processes. While our approach is robust and effective under
realistic conditions, we believe that our work is an important
exploratory first step within a vast and challenging new space,
and has identified several interesting future directions.
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APPENDIX
A. Background
1) General training and backpropagation.: In the general
case, we use a subset of available data as training samples that
the networks attempt to best describe by adjusting their pa-
rameters accordingly. This adjustment step is usually done by
passing a number of samples trough the network, acquiring the
output and combining it with a function that is usually referred
to as a loss function or cost module. This loss function outputs
a value, usually scalar, that is a metric representing the error
or distance of the network’s output relative to the ground truth.
Driving the loss towards zero is a desirable goal, as it tends to
lead to a better performing network; this is done by adjusting
the parameters of the network in such a way that if we passed
the same sample we used to obtain the loss for this iteration the
new output’s loss will be smaller. This is generally performed
with a method known as backpropagation (proven to be able
to train deep networks [82]), which essentially uses the chain
differentiation rule to discover the contribution of each of
the network’s parameters to the computed loss. The algorithm
starts computing the expressions from the final layers of the
network (closest to the output), towards the start, computing
the error contributions of each layer’s representation based on
the previous layer’s representation of the input. The general
algorithm employed for the actual adjustment step, i.e, the
magnitude and direction of change, is given by a gradient
descent-based algorithm such as Stochastic Gradient Descent
(SGD) or variants like Adam [83] and AdaDelta [84].
2) SigMF: storing I/Q data.: Storing and sharing RF data
had been a long standing problem. Following the DARPA RF
initiative, the SigMF specification was established in 2017 to
tackle this issue and allow for a flexible yet well-specified
standard for sharing RF data in an efficient manner. The raw
I/Q data is specified in an interleaved form in a binary file
where the precise location of each signal in the data file is
denoted in an accompanying metadata file in a JSON format.
The metadata files also contain a host of additional information
such as capture details, sampling rate and may optionally be
extended to support new custom headers. All the datasets used
in this work utilize the SigMF [85] specification.
3) Quadrature Modulation: Figure 11 depicts a schematic
of an ideal quadrature modulator. The output signal is com-
posed of a linear combination of signals in-phase or “I”
component and the quadrature or “Q” component. Besides its
apparent simplicity, quadrature modulators can synthesize any
real signal.
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Fig. 11: Quadrature Modulation Overview and I/Q data. An
inverse procedure is followed on the receiver side in order to
obtain the I/Q pair from the modulated signal.
4) Inverse Square Root of Matrix V: To guarantee the
existence of the inverse square root we leverage the Tikhonov
regularization [86] that is performed by:  I + V. Mean
subtraction and multiplication by the inverse square root of the
variance guarantees a standard complex distribution with mean
µ = 0, covariance Γ = 1 and relation C = 0. As in the real
case batch normalization procedure, two learnable parameters
are used: the shift parameter β and scale parameter γ. These
translate and scale a layer’s input along new learned principal
components to achieve the desired variance.
B. Data Augmentation using Rotation, Scaling and Noise
While our experiments using decimation revealed that it
can have a positive impact, we found that for our particular
task these transformations actually have a negative impact on
our system’s performance. Below we provide more details for
these augmentations.
1) Rotation and scaling.: Similarly to their 2D counterparts
(images), signals can be rotated (phase shift) and scaled
(magnitude scaling). This lead to an expansion of the amount
of available data by introducing reversible transformations.
We induce rotation by adding a phase shift and scaling
by altering the magnitude of each complex data point. To
calculate the phase and magnitude we convert each point to
polar form, perform the necessary calculations, and recover the
I/Q components using Euler’s equations. Formulae 2 describe
the procedure for rotation, scaling follows the same principle.
Original Signal = I +Qj
Polar Form = ρeφ, ρ =
√
I2 +Q2, φ = arctan (I,Q)
Rotation(θ) = ρeιφeιθ = ρeι(φ+θ)
I ′ = ρ cos (φ+ θ), Q′ = ρ sin (φ+ θ)j,
Rotated Signal = I ′ +Q′j
(2)
2) Adding noise - channel effects.: Perhaps the most promi-
nent problem regarding RF data is the effect the channel
has to captured signals under different channel conditions. As
shown in Figure 1 signals from the same device captured over
different days can differ drastically. The fundamental way the
signal mutates under different channel conditions introduces
a mismatch between the data used for training and signals
captured for testing at a later time when the ambient channel
conditions deviate significantly between them. We evaluated
two methodologies and their efficacy in improving the model’s
generalization in regards with being able to classify signals
from a day not part of the training set: (i) Augmenting the
dataset by introducing samples from different days in the
training data (ii) Augmenting captured signals synthetically by
introducing Rician or Rayleigh fading using a SISO channel
model, based on [87].
C. Hyperparameters
The hyperparameters used for each architecture are ob-
tained using Spearmint [57], thus allowing 500 runs for each
(complex) architecture. The input data used in Spearmint for
optimizing the hyperparameters is a balanced dataset that It
is important to note that even though using Spearmint and
its underlying Bayesian optimization engine requires less tries
than conventional searches such as grid search, we were still
unable to exhaustively explore all options as that would require
a prohibitive amount of time and used the best values after
500 tests. We included the following hyperparameters in the
Spearmint exploration for each architecture:
CDCN: Learning rate, kernel/stride/padding of the convo-
lutional layer, the size of the output dense layer.
RDCN: Learning rate, weight decay, the timestep (µs) used
by the sequencer to split the signal,the size of the hidden layer
of the LSTM, the number of layers in the LSTM unit and
whether it should be bidirectional or not.
For both architectures the Spearmint search configurations
also include the factor of decimation factor M and explore
whether the following layers should be part of the architecture
or not: (i) batch normalization for the input layer,(ii) batch
normalization for each layer independently. For the decimation
factor our exploration range lies between two and four, given
our sampling rate factors above 2 violate Nyquist criterion, and
the original signal (for the WiFi category) can no longer be
faithfully reconstructed. Since our goal in this work is rather to
fingerprint the devices and not to reconstruct the original signal
we evaluated the impact of using higher decimation factors,
even if that would violate Nyquist’s theorem. We identified that
indeed the best results where obtained with a decimation factor
of 2 (which obeys the theorem). As a final note, while the
non-conforming (M > 2) decimation factors produced worst
results they also led to less computations and less parameters
which in some applications might be a wanted outcome.
Optimized hyperparameters. Our exploration revealed
the following hyperparameters and network configurations:
CDCN: lr=1e-4, weight decay=9e-5, kernel size=32, stride=1,
padding=1, dense layer=4096.
RDCN lr=1e-4, weight decay=9e-5, single layer unidirec-
tional LSTM with 1024 hidden units and sequencer time step
set to 1µ leading to 64 vectors of 100 data points for the
baseline setting.
For both networks the batch normalization layers were
found to be of critical importance and the best performing
activation unit was found to be CReLU. We believe that since
our channels are mixed channels containing information that
is not entirely real or imaginary, the effect of ZReLU that
constricts activations to the first quadrant is over-constraining
the network, whereas the outcome of CReLU that allows
activation on positive values for both channels shows better
results.
It is important to note that these hyperparameters are opti-
mized for our design goals, i.e., operating on raw I/Q data and
with minimal pre-processing being performed. Alternate data
representations or extra pre-processing steps would potentially
render these hyperparameters invalid and a re-exploration using
Spearmint (or a conventional, albeit slower, grid search) to
obtain the optimal parameters would be required.
